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1. Introduction
On February 24, 2016, the Province of Ontario in Canada introduced the Climate Change
Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act (the “Ontario Climate Act”), and a Cap and Trade Program
Regulations (the “Regulations”) on February 25, 2016.1 The Act and the Regulations will undergo a
45-day public and stakeholder comment period. If passed into law, this legislation would formally
establish a cap and trade program in Ontario, adding Ontario to a growing roster of municipal,
provincial, federal, regional, and international regimes that have embraced the cap and trade
system as an instrument choice for combating climate change.2 The Ontario Climate Act interweaves
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1
Proposed Climate Change Mitigation and Low-Carbon Economy Act,
2016
(Bill
172)
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&BillID=3740&detailPage=bills_detail_the_bill>
accessed March 03, 2016. See also
The
Cap
and
Trade
Program
Regulations
(Regulations)
on
February
25,
2016,
<http://www.downloads.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/er/documents/2016/012-6837_DraftReg.pdf>
accessed March 03, 2016.
2 While command and control instruments, such as carbon tax, focus on imposing emission reduction
standards/targets by an authority that must be complied with, with sanctions resulting from non†
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several essential precepts of a cap-and trade system with governance innovations that are, at least
arguably, unique. The cap-and-trade program is expected to come in force on January 1, 2017.
A cap and trade program, also known as emission trading, is a market-based mechanism to
reduce greenhouse gases (GHG), under which emitters are provided economic incentives and
flexibility to achieve GHG reductions. Under this approach, a governmental or regulatory body
sets a cap on the specific amount of carbon dioxide (or equivalents) that capped entities or
participants are allowed to emit each year. 3 Capped entities, mainly companies or operators of
high emitting facilities, that emit below their annual targets can sell unused credits to another
participant, while entities that cannot meet their reduction obligations by improving their own
efficiencies are able to buy carbon credits to offset their emissions.4 In essence, carbon credit is a
financial instrument that represents the removal of one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e)
from the atmosphere.5 The underlying aim of this system therefore is to provide flexible options
for large emitters to reduce carbon emissions over time. In theory, this flexibility should decrease
the overall costs of compliance with emission reduction targets. The cap on carbon emissions also
incentivizes investment in clean technologies, thus facilitating the creation of new jobs and the
transition to a low-carbon economy.

compliance, market-based instruments include cap-and-trade schemes, offsets schemes or baseline-andcredit schemes that puts a price on GHG emissions with the purpose of reducing them. This paper talks
about market-based instruments as the main exponent of carbon pricing policies. Emission trading schemes
have been adopted in 12 jurisdictions across the world. These include the European Union Emissions
Trading System (EU ETS), the Australian Emissions Trading System, the New Zealand Emissions Trading
System, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeastern United States, the California Emissions
Trading System, Alberta-Based Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program and Offset Credit System; Quebec Capand-Trade Scheme; and the Tokyo Emissions Trading System. Others schemes stand on the verge of
commencing operations, including and the Republic of Korea’s Cap-and-Trade Scheme. Chinese provinces
(Hubei and Guangdong) and cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Shenzhen) have also
proposed Cap-and-Trade Schemes. China will by 2017 launch a nationwide cap-and-trade system.
3 Emissions trading, under the international climate regime, is set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol,
allows countries with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to buy emission units from other countries
with commitments and use them towards meeting a part of their targets.
4 Generally, carbon trade is a transaction whereby a buyer purchases, and a seller sells, carbon credits; while
carbon markets are virtual financial marketplaces where sale and exchange of carbon credits occur.
Participants in the carbon market, mostly governments and business enterprises, divide carbon credits into
commodity units, which are then tracked, priced and traded, depending on the participant’s relative
capacity and needs vis-à-vis their targets. For detailed examination of the nature and scope of carbon
finance, see Damilola Olawuyi, The Human Right Based Approach to Carbon Finance (Cambridge University
Press, 2016) 31-32.
5 To find a common unit for this commodity, all GHGs are converted to CO2 equivalents (CO2-eq).5 CO2-eqs
are traded on carbon markets. See Damilola Olawuyi, The Human Right Based Approach to Carbon Finance,
supra note 4.
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The Ontario Climate Act enshrines into law, Ontario's ambitious plans and targets to achieve
15 percent GHG reduction below 1990 levels by 2020, 37 percent below 1990 levels by 2030, and 80
percent below 1990 levels by 2050.6 It also establishes a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Account into
which all proceeds from Ontario's cap and trade program would be deposited. Furthermore, based
on government estimates, Ontario expects to generate approximately $1.8-1.9 billion per year in
proceeds from the cap and trade program, and will invest such proceeds ‘in programs that reduce
greenhouse gas pollution, help save families money and reward innovative companies by creating
more opportunities for investment in Ontario.’7
Ontario’s cap-and-trade program is both ambitious and innovative. Apart from
establishing a legal tool through which Ontario can achieve its emission reduction targets, it also
creates a mechanism through which proceeds from the program can be reinvested to alleviate
social and environmental problems in Ontario. The Government of Ontario has already created a
$325-million Green Investment Fund that will commit to projects that will fight climate change,
grow the economy and create jobs.8 This Fund, if effectively administered, provides realistic and
long-term strategies to combine emission reduction goals with economic and social development.
This holistic approach has delivered positive prospects in countries such as Romania where
proceeds of carbon credits have been utilized for social development programs.9
Furthermore, being Canada’s most populous province, and home to nearly 50 percent of all

See L Goldstein, “Cap-and-trade: The next Liberal rip-off” (Toronto Sun, February 25, 2016) <
http://www.torontosun.com/2016/02/25/cap-and-trade-the-next-liberal-rip-off> sting that “The plan repeats
almost every blunder made by Europe’s decade-old cap-and-trade market, the Emissions Trading Scheme,
unsurprising given the Liberals consulted with ETS bureaucrats in drafting their plan.” See also K Libin,
“Ontario’s new cap-and-trade plan is a tawdry tax-and-spend scheme sold as a gift of ‘clean air for
our children” <http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/kevin-libin-ontarios-new-cap-and-trade-planis-a-tawdry-tax-and-spend-scheme-sold-as-a-gift-of-clean-air-for-our-children> accessed February 25, 2016,
stating that “The truly surprising thing about the new Ontario cap-and-trade emissions regime isn’t that,
when so many layers of feel-good enviro-coddling spin is stripped away, it’s ultimately designed to suck
what could amount to hundreds of dollars from families’ pockets and funnel it into a big slush pile for the
Liberals to then sprinkle treats over favored sectors. The real marvel is that it took them this long to land on
the scheme.”
7 See “Ontario Introduces New Climate Change Legislation”
< https://news.ontario.ca/ene/en/2016/02/ontario-introduces-new-climate-change-legislation.html>
8 Government of Ontario, Green Investment Fund, <https://www.ontario.ca/page/green-investment-fund>
accessed March 03, 2016.
9 In 2013-2014, Romania generated about 260 million Euros, and are hoping to raise another about 2 billion
Euros during the 2016-2020 period, from the country’s cap-and-trade program. The proceeds have been used
to construct new bike lanes and metro stations. See The World Bank, New bike lanes and metro stations in
Bucharest paid for by carbon credits <http://blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange/new-bike-lanes-and-metrostations-bucharest-paid-carbon-credits> accessed March 03, 2016.
6
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Canadians, climate action by Ontario is fundamental if Canada is to achieve its Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) of reducing GHG emissions economy-wide by 30%
below 2005 levels by 2030.10 Ontario’s proposed program is a positive effort that, if effectively
implemented, could influence and inform Canada’s climate action over the next years.
Despite its innovative approach however, the proposed Act has already received flak from
commentators who consider the proposed legislation as less of a carbon-reduction plan than a
public rip-off, a “feel-good enviro-coddling spin,” and a false start to climate change action.11
This paper evaluates the potentials and pitfalls of the Ontario Climate Act. It identifies its
areas of innovation and strengths, key implementation and logistical questions that may arise, and
offers perspectives on how to address such gaps.

2. Evaluation of the Ontario Climate Act
Radu has developed a helpful model for assessing the potential and environmental
integrity of an emission-trading scheme, which includes effectiveness; comprehensiveness;
transparency and fairness; and offset eligibility.12 In the following sections I use this paradigm to
evaluate Ontario’s proposed legislation. The central aim, here, is to determine whether the Ontario
Climate Act, in its current form, has the potential to deliver real, measurable, additional, long term
and sustainable reduction in GHGs in Ontario.

The Government of Canada submitted its intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) to the
UNFCCC Secretariat in May 2015. Canada intends to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions economywide by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. See Canada’s INDC Submission to the UNFCCC,
<http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Canada/1/INDC%20%20Canada%20-%20English.pdf> > accessed March 03, 2016.
11 See L Goldstein, “Cap-and-trade: The next Liberal rip-off” (Toronto Sun, February 25, 2016)
<http://www.torontosun.com/2016/02/25/cap-and-trade-the-next-liberal-rip-off> sting that “The plan repeats
almost every blunder made by Europe’s decade-old cap-and-trade market, the Emissions Trading Scheme,
unsurprising given the Liberals consulted with ETS bureaucrats in drafting their plan.” See also K Libin,
“Ontario’s new cap-and-trade plan is a tawdry tax-and-spend scheme sold as a gift of ‘clean air for
our children” <http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/kevin-libin-ontarios-new-cap-and-trade-planis-a-tawdry-tax-and-spend-scheme-sold-as-a-gift-of-clean-air-for-our-children> accessed February 25, 2016,
stating that “The truly surprising thing about the new Ontario cap-and-trade emissions regime isn’t that,
when so many layers of feel-good enviro-coddling spin is stripped away, it’s ultimately designed to suck
what could amount to hundreds of dollars from families’ pockets and funnel it into a big slush pile for the
Liberals to then sprinkle treats over favoured sectors. The real marvel is that it took them this long to land on
the scheme.”
12 A Radu, ‘Alberta's CO2 Reduction Strategy – Assessing the Environmental Integrity of Emissions Trading
Schemes’ (Canadian Institute of Resources Law 2014) 7-11
<http://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/50352/1/EmissionsOP45w.pdf > accessed March 03, 2016.
10
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A. Effectiveness
The first question is whether the Ontario emission trading scheme establishes a stringent
cap on emission reductions and adequately regulates major emission sources.13 This question can
be answered affirmatively. The Ontario Climate Act in Section 1, establishes a verifiable emissions
amount and sets a deadline in Section 5, within which capped entities must submit their emission
allowances and credits, following the end of the compliance period. The compliance period is
stated in section 2 as January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2020, and January 1, 2021 to December 31,
2023 and each subsequent three-year period. Section 4 describes the cost equivalent per tonne of
reductions. The cap will decline by 3.7 percent in each of the next three years, falling to 15 per cent
below 1990 levels by 2020.
The Act is sweeping in its coverage of emission sources. The definition of ‘prescribed
activity’ in Section 3 includes all key sectors with high historical emissions of GHGs that are
already subject to Ontario’s greenhouse gas emissions reporting regulation (the “Reporting
Regulation”). 14 Section 14 (2) of the proposed Ontario Climate Act provides that any entity
required under the Reporting Regulation to submit a report and verification statement in 2016,
with respect to greenhouse gas emissions in 2015, is a mandatory participant under the proposed
cap-and-trade program. This covers a wide range of sectors cutting across agriculture, electricity
generation, iron and steel production, , natural gas distribution and petroleum product supply.
Furthermore, in order to avoid a flood of non-additional or business-as-usual allowances,
Section 6 restricts emission allowances that may be submitted for a compliance period. They are:
allowances transferred into a compliance account as a result of a successful purchase of emission
allowances offered for sale; Ontario emission allowances classified by the Minister as generated
within a year in the compliance period or an earlier year; or within the first or second year
following the end of the compliance period. Furthermore, the Act elaborates types of initiatives
that may be funded from proceeds of the cap and trade program. Eligible initiatives include those
relating to energy use, land use and buildings, infrastructure, transportation, industry, agriculture
and forestry, waste management, education and training, and research and innovation.

See Radu, ibid.
See Section 5 of Ontario’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting Regulation, Reg. 452/09, under the
Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19. A person who owns or operates a facility at which GHG
emitting activities, that are comprehensively listed in Table 2 of the Reporting Regulation, occurs is required
to quantify and report GHG emissions associated with those activities as applicable under the Regulation.
13
14
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By extending its reach to a wide range of activities and sectors, the proposed Ontario
Climate Act, arguably, meets the requirement of effectiveness and has strong potentials to
adequately regulate key emission sources in Ontario.
B. Comprehensiveness
A sustainable emission-trading scheme must identify and encapsulate all sources of GHG
emissions.

As Radu rightly notes ‘the extent to which the particular ETS covers sources of

emissions and emission gases is a measure of the comprehensiveness of the ETS.’15 Furthermore, as
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommends in its Guidelines for Compiling
GHG Inventories, methodologies for estimating, assembling, documenting and transmitting GHG
inventory data must be consistent and comprehensive, regardless of the method used to produce
the estimates.16
The proposed Ontario Climate Act identifies two types of eligible GHG emissions: CO2 and
non-CO2 emissions. However the Act fails to include a comprehensive list of gases that come
under the non-CO2 emissions. In various portions, the Act references methane (CH4) and nitrous
oxide (N2O) leaving out from its definitions and scope, a wide suite of other GHGs that have been
identified by the IPCC as GHGs responsible for climate change. These include hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs); perfluorocarbons (PFCs); sulphur hexafluoride (SF6); nitrogen trifluoride (NF3);
trifluoromethyl sulphur pentafluoride (SF5CF3); halogenated ethers; and halocarbons not covered
by the Montreal Protocol including CF3I, CH2Br2 CHCl3.17
By failing to clearly specify perhaps in the definition section, or in an appendix, a list of
non-CO2 gases to be caped and regulated, the proposed Ontario Climate Act falls into the trap of
lack of specificity, a gap that could pose implementation challenges in the long-term. One way of
ensuring specificity is for the Act to refer to the comprehensive list of GHGs contained in the
Reporting Regulation, some of which are also captured in Canada’s INDC.18

Ibid at 9.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories (Hayama, Japan: Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, 2006).
17 Ibid.
18 See Table 1 of the Reporting Regulation, see also ‘Gases Covered’ in Canada’s INDC Submission to the
UNFCCC, supra note 10.
15
16
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C. Transparency and Fairness
A robust cap-and-trade system must adopt transparent mechanisms for creating emission
allowances, setting price caps, and distributing emission allowances through auction.
Transparency requires that the “rules of the game” are clarified in a fair and open manner. The
Ontario Climate Act, arguably, incorporates robust mechanisms that, if effectively implemented,
could guarantee transparency.
Section 34 of the Act sets a reasonable number of Ontario emission allowances that the
Minister for Environment and Climate Change shall create each year:
Year

Number of Allowance

2017

142,332,000

2018

136,440,000

2019

130,556,000

2020

124,668,000

The Minister is empowered in Section 35 to reserve and sell reserve five per cent (5%) of all
Ontario emission allowances created. Section 36 allows the Minister to auction emission
allowances that have been reserved by, or submitted to, the Minister. To provide fair and adequate
notices to participants, Section 38 provides that the Minister shall provide notice of an auction or
sale to the public in such manner as the Minister considers appropriate, setting out following
information on the date, time, location, process, and requirements of the auction or sale.
Section 42 mandates the Minister to make available to the public, within 45 days following
the conclusion of the auction or sale and in a manner that the Minister considers appropriate, a
written summary of each auction or sale. This summary will set out key information such as the
lowest bid price accepted, registered participants who submitted bids in the auction or sale; details
regarding the number of emission allowances sold, the number of each vintage year or category of
emission allowances sold, and a description of how the emission allowances were distributed
among the participants who submitted bids, without identifying which participants purchased the
emission allowances.
By incorporating provisions that will ensure that clear and detailed information on market
activities and transactions are transparently disclosed, the Ontario Climate Act can stimulate trust
and protect access to information rights.
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D. Offset eligibility
Flexibility is very important in combating climate change. By allowing participants to
utilize international credits generated from project-based mechanisms, such as the Kyoto
Protocol’s CDM and Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism, toward fulfilling part of their domestic
obligations; emission reduction schemes can provide opportunities for participants to achieve
emission reduction at the least cost possible. Section 7 of the Ontario Climate Act provides that
offset credits may be submitted for a compliance period. In order to create a robust offset credit
program in Ontario, it is envisaged, in the proposed legislation, that a separate offsets regulation
will be proposed later in 2016 if the climate change legislation passes. According to the Ontario
Climate Act, the offsets regulation will describe the requirements proponents must meet to be able
to create, verify and register offset credits for use in Ontario’s greenhouse gas cap and trade
program, including requirements for protocols. Protocols set out the requirements to demonstrate
the offset criteria such as ownership, and that proposed offsets are real, additional, verified,
unique, permanent, and enforceable, to ensure that offset projects produce the emission reductions
being claimed.
In designing offset regulations, it is important to adopt a lessons learned approach that
draws on some of the several implementation challenges facing offset mechanisms, such as the
CDM, at international level. Studies show that failure to introduce human rights safeguards in
carbon actions and projects may exacerbate human rights violations and create complex challenges
and risks for a cap-and-trade system. 19 It is particularly important to consider allegations of
forceful land grabs, violation of human rights, siting and concentration of projects in poor
communities, and lack of accountability by participants in carbon markets, in the execution of
CDM projects. These precedents should provide some useful lessons. As the Paris Agreement
recognises in its preamble,
Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote
and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the
rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with
See Damilola Olawuyi, The Human Right Based Approach to Carbon Finance, supra note 4. See also
Damilola Olawuyi, Climate Justice and Corporate Responsibility: Taking Human Rights
Seriously in Climate Actions and Projects (2016) 34: 1 JOURNAL OF ENERGY & NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW, 1-18; United Nations Environment Program, Climate Change and Human Rights (UNEP
2015) 9-10; and International Bar Association, Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report,
Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption (International Bar Association 2014) 147153.
19
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disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as
well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.20

3. Conclusion
The Ontario Climate Act is a timely, comprehensive and positive legislation with far more
strengths than weaknesses. Coming at a time when the world is looking to hold the increase in the
global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, and to limit
temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, the proposed legislation provides a new
impetus for a dynamic carbon market that can stimulate progress, and herald a new dawn, in
achieving this goal.
The efficacy of the proposed legislation will even be improved if it is infused with
procedural and accountability safeguards to address human rights risks and questions that will
inevitably arise in carbon offset projects. The legislation, and its accompanying regulations, should
establish inspection panels and dispute resolution mechanism through which emission reduction
actions and projects that violate existing environmental and human rights laws and norms can be
identified and screened out from credit trading.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), The Paris Agreement, Conference
of
the
Parties,
Twenty-first
Session
Paris,
30
November
to
11
December
2015,
<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf> accessed February 25, 2016.
20
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